Showing posts with label Prevent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prevent. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

How to Prevent Interplanetary Pandemics

The Mars Science Laboratory rover gets the clean-room treatment. (NASA/JPL-Caltech)

After completing its mission, a satellite re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere and lands, kicking up a cloud of dust in the American southwest.  The recovery team mobilizes, but when they begin to inspect the spacecraft, things start to go horribly wrong.  Team members suddenly collapse, dead, and it soon becomes clear that the entire population of the nearest town has suffered a similar fate.

Michael Crichton completionists will recognize the above scenario as the plot of the 1969 thriller The Andromeda Strain, but to a select group of scientists and engineers, it represents a real – if remote – possibility of harmful interplanetary contamination.  That’s right, all that lies between you and this horror story is NASA’s Planetary Protection Office (PPO), with its understated motto to keep watch over “all of the planets, all of the time.”

Planetary protection deals with both sides of the interplanetary coin: it must prevent the transfer of Earth-based life to other celestial bodies (known as forward-contamination, which would complicate the detection of any native biology), and avoid the introduction of any extraterrestrial biota to life on this planet (back-contamination).

To the more sober-minded members of the public, planetary protection seems foolhardy at best and wasteful at worst: after all, both forward- and back-contamination of sites like Mars has almost certainly already happened.

The protocol for sterilizing the Viking Landers involved cooking the spacecraft to 111.7 degrees Celsius for 30 hours, and the team searched for potential contaminants by trying to culture microbes in pre-defined nutrient mixes.  What 1970s scientists didn’t realize is that some organisms can survive such high temperatures, and the tests for survivors may have missed the hardiest microbes.  Dr. Moogega Cooper, a planetary protection engineer at JPL, believes the dependence on culturing is a problem.  “It is a well known fact that only 1% of microbes can be grown on culture media,” she notes.  “Using our culture-based methods may not be enough in my opinion to effectively assess how much contamination we are transporting to other solar bodies.”

In the case of back-contamination, about 40 kilograms of Mars snows down on Earth every year, mostly as micrometeorites, slipping in under the PPO’s radar.

Of course, none of this means we shouldn’t seek to limit contamination in the future, and NASA’s Planetary Protection team thinks about their directive in terms of probabilities and risk-benefit analyses.  In general, risk can be evaluated as a balance between the likelihood of a negative event happening and the severity of that event.  Back-contamination of planet Earth presents an extremely low risk, but the seriousness of that risk – an interplanetary pandemic – is extremely high.  Given this calculus, it’s worth investing in safeguards for all of the samples we can control.

Dr. John Rummel, a Professor of Biology at East Carolina University, is the author of NASA’s draft protocol for handling martian samples, written during a fit of budgetary optimism in 2002.  (Reading from a slide during last week’s Conference on Life Detection in Extraterrestrial Samples, Rummel referred to a mission plan that would “return no earlier than 2011.  So far so good,” he quipped, sardonically acknowledging the endless delays that have characterized the elusive sample return mission.)

The protocol calls for sterilization by heat and gamma irradiation in proportions that would kill any viable organisms but leave geochemical traits – like isotopic ratios, elemental compositions, or crystal structures – unchanged.  High radiation doses or high temperatures can irreversibly alter rock samples, but using moderate radiation levels at elevated temperatures allows you to combine the killing power of both without the deleterious effects of either.

The Planetary Protection team would be the first line of defense against potential biological contaminants, but it would also be the first – and possibly only – team to study pristine martian samples, a fact that irks some scientists.  After all, the thinking goes, sterilization would destroy any primary evidence of viable cells, obscuring critical information from the most valuable cargo to ever be acquired from an interplanetary mission.

What much of the scientific community is overlooking is that both planetary protection officers and scientists have the same overall goal: to find and describe any biological organisms that may be inside martian rocks.  Secondary motivations aren’t quite as synergistic, but scientists and the PPO must find workable compromises.  Determining which instruments to include in the quarantined laboratories, developing sterilization techniques that are minimally destructive, and establishing a workflow that follows the “first life detection, then biohazard analysis” mantra are all important opportunities to bring the two groups together.  Such coordination would improve everyone’s ability to do his job, maximizing scientific yield and minimizing the risk of an Andromeda Strain reality show.

Jeff Marlow is a graduate student in Geological and Planetary Sciences at the California Institute of Technology where he studies exotic microbial metabolisms in an attempt to understand the limits of life on Earth and beyond.

View the original article here

Monday, February 27, 2012

How to Prevent Interplanetary Pandemics

The Mars Science Laboratory rover gets the clean-room treatment. (NASA/JPL-Caltech)

After completing its mission, a satellite re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere and lands, kicking up a cloud of dust in the American southwest.  The recovery team mobilizes, but when they begin to inspect the spacecraft, things start to go horribly wrong.  Team members suddenly collapse, dead, and it soon becomes clear that the entire population of the nearest town has suffered a similar fate.

Michael Crichton completionists will recognize the above scenario as the plot of the 1969 thriller The Andromeda Strain, but to a select group of scientists and engineers, it represents a real – if remote – possibility of harmful interplanetary contamination.  That’s right, all that lies between you and this horror story is NASA’s Planetary Protection Office (PPO), with its understated motto to keep watch over “all of the planets, all of the time.”

Planetary protection deals with both sides of the interplanetary coin: it must prevent the transfer of Earth-based life to other celestial bodies (known as forward-contamination, which would complicate the detection of any native biology), and avoid the introduction of any extraterrestrial biota to life on this planet (back-contamination).

To the more sober-minded members of the public, planetary protection seems foolhardy at best and wasteful at worst: after all, both forward- and back-contamination of sites like Mars has almost certainly already happened.

The protocol for sterilizing the Viking Landers involved cooking the spacecraft to 111.7 degrees Celsius for 30 hours, and the team searched for potential contaminants by trying to culture microbes in pre-defined nutrient mixes.  What 1970s scientists didn’t realize is that some organisms can survive such high temperatures, and the tests for survivors may have missed the hardiest microbes.  Dr. Moogega Cooper, a planetary protection engineer at JPL, believes the dependence on culturing is a problem.  “It is a well known fact that only 1% of microbes can be grown on culture media,” she notes.  “Using our culture-based methods may not be enough in my opinion to effectively assess how much contamination we are transporting to other solar bodies.”

In the case of back-contamination, about 40 kilograms of Mars snows down on Earth every year, mostly as micrometeorites, slipping in under the PPO’s radar.

Of course, none of this means we shouldn’t seek to limit contamination in the future, and NASA’s Planetary Protection team thinks about their directive in terms of probabilities and risk-benefit analyses.  In general, risk can be evaluated as a balance between the likelihood of a negative event happening and the severity of that event.  Back-contamination of planet Earth presents an extremely low risk, but the seriousness of that risk – an interplanetary pandemic – is extremely high.  Given this calculus, it’s worth investing in safeguards for all of the samples we can control.

Dr. John Rummel, a Professor of Biology at East Carolina University, is the author of NASA’s draft protocol for handling martian samples, written during a fit of budgetary optimism in 2002.  (Reading from a slide during last week’s Conference on Life Detection in Extraterrestrial Samples, Rummel referred to a mission plan that would “return no earlier than 2011.  So far so good,” he quipped, sardonically acknowledging the endless delays that have characterized the elusive sample return mission.)

The protocol calls for sterilization by heat and gamma irradiation in proportions that would kill any viable organisms but leave geochemical traits – like isotopic ratios, elemental compositions, or crystal structures – unchanged.  High radiation doses or high temperatures can irreversibly alter rock samples, but using moderate radiation levels at elevated temperatures allows you to combine the killing power of both without the deleterious effects of either.

The Planetary Protection team would be the first line of defense against potential biological contaminants, but it would also be the first – and possibly only – team to study pristine martian samples, a fact that irks some scientists.  After all, the thinking goes, sterilization would destroy any primary evidence of viable cells, obscuring critical information from the most valuable cargo to ever be acquired from an interplanetary mission.

What much of the scientific community is overlooking is that both planetary protection officers and scientists have the same overall goal: to find and describe any biological organisms that may be inside martian rocks.  Secondary motivations aren’t quite as synergistic, but scientists and the PPO must find workable compromises.  Determining which instruments to include in the quarantined laboratories, developing sterilization techniques that are minimally destructive, and establishing a workflow that follows the “first life detection, then biohazard analysis” mantra are all important opportunities to bring the two groups together.  Such coordination would improve everyone’s ability to do his job, maximizing scientific yield and minimizing the risk of an Andromeda Strain reality show.

Jeff Marlow is a graduate student in Geological and Planetary Sciences at the California Institute of Technology where he studies exotic microbial metabolisms in an attempt to understand the limits of life on Earth and beyond.

View the original article here

Thursday, February 23, 2012

Regulators Plan Safeguards to Prevent Another MF Global

Federal regulators are narrowing a list of possible new safeguards for customers at futures firms, a response to the collapse of MF Global and the disappearance of more than $1 billion in client cash.

MF GlobalThe Commodity Futures Trading Commission will hold a public roundtable next week to discuss policy changes, including a plan that would allow customers to trade through futures brokerage firms without keeping their excess cash there, according to a copy of the agenda provided to The New York Times.

The plan, which would allow customers to keep their cash at clearinghouses rather than brokerage firms, is gaining support in pockets of the regulatory world. The commission is also circulating an internal list of more than 10 other ideas, including keeping customers updated on the whereabouts of their money and creating an insurance fund to backstop losses in customer accounts.

People close to the agency cautioned that the list was preliminary and could be whittled down. The agency, the people said, might issue a release in the coming weeks that outlines a few favored policy options.

A few new rules were already under way before MF Global [MF.F  Loading...      ()   ] filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 31. In December, the C.F.T.C. limited how brokerage firms can invest customer money.

On Thursday, the agency will vote on a rule that will require a brokerage firm’s chief compliance officer to create internal controls for protecting customer money, an effort that began in 2010.

But the disappearance of more than $1 billion in MF Global’s customer money, a significant blemish for regulators, widened the scope and the stakes of the crackdown. The fiasco, proponents of an overhaul say, highlighted gaping holes in the regulatory system that allowed MF Global to mingle customer money with firm funds.


Current DateTime: 03:41:46 23 Feb 2012
LinksList Documentid: 22528753“This was a bucket of cold water in the face” for regulators, said Bart Chilton, a Democratic member of the commission, who is championing the insurance fund, among other changes.

Regulators and the trustee with the job of returning money to customers have traced most of the missing futures money to an assortment of MF Global’s banks, securities customers and trading partners, people briefed on the case have said. But clawing the money back will be daunting, because some of these recipients were entitled to payouts from MF Global. The delay has shaken the firm’s clients, a mix of hedge fund traders and farmers, who are still lacking nearly a third of their money.

Over the last few months, the breach of customer accounts has become the subject of a sprawling federal investigation. Federal prosecutors in New York and Chicago, the F.B.I. and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are all examining potential wrongdoing.

The case also carries ramifications beyond the courtroom — and even MF Global. The broader futures industry now faces a wave of regulations that seek to avert a repeat of MF Global’s sins.

The seeds of an overhaul are seen in the list of policy ideas circulating the trading commission. The list features several ambitious ideas, like a plan that would force the agency to keep a closer eye on so-called self-regulators, private firms that police the futures industry.

Other ideas are more modest, including requiring brokerage firms to regularly disclose the safety of the money of their customers. Currently, most futures firms must share their reports with regulators only monthly.

Another item likely to be discussed at the meeting next week is a plan to modify the agency’s bankruptcy rules that govern how customers’ assets are doled out when a firm collapses. MF Global customers have complained that they are at the back of the line in the claims process, behind the firm’s banks and creditors.

Sensing a crackdown, the industry has moved to produce its own ideas for change. The Futures Industry Association, an influential trade group, created a task force to study policy changes. Self regulators, groups like the CME Group and the National Futures Association, have formed a similar committee.

Capitol Hill has weighed in, too. The Senate agriculture committee last month sent letters to a range of industry players, seeking their input on whether Congress should draft new laws in response to the MF Global debacle.

“A central principle of the futures market was broken and a good dose of the rule of law is probably the first step toward bringing back confidence,” said Jamie Selway, a managing director at ITG, a firm that operates an electronic equities and futures business. “The question is how do you do it?”

This story originally appeared in The New York Times

View the original article here